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Notes
ADMImALTY-ASSUMPTION OF RISK UNDER THE JONES ACT-The
plaintiff, a seaman, brought an action under the Jones Act' for
injuries sustained in the course of his duty. The accident occurred
as the result of his knowingly using a defective appliance when
he could have used a safe one. A judgment for the plaintiff was
affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals2 and by the Supreme
Court. It was held, that assumption of risk is no bar to the plain-
tiff's recovery under the Jones Act, but that in conformity with
the admiralty rule of comparative negligence his choice of a de-
fective appliance may be considered in mitigation of damages.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 59 S.Ct. 262, 83
L.Ed. 261 (1939).-
Prior to the Jones Act, the defense of assumption of risk was
not entertained in admiralty.4 The inapplicability of this defense
was occasioned by the hazardous characteristics peculiar to the
seaman's calling, "the rigid discipline to which he is subject, and
the practical difficulties of his avoiding exposure to risks of unsea-
worthiness and defective appliances." 5 Such considerations were
largely the basis for the traditional policy of regarding seamen as
the wards of admiralty.8
By the Jones Act, it is provided that a seaman injured in the
course of his employment "may, at his election, maintain an action
for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such
action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending
the common-law right or remedy in case of personal injury to
railway employees shall apply. . . ."I The declared purpose of
this legislation was to enlarge, rather than to narrow, the pro-
tection accorded seamen by the traditional doctrines of the mari-
1. 38 Stat. 1185, § 20 (1915), as amended by 41 Stat. 1007, § 33 (1920), 46
U.S.C.A. § 688 (1926).
2. Smith v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 96 F. (2d) 98 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1938).
3. For a brief discussion of the case, see Robinson, Admiralty (1939)
315, § 39.
4. Olson v. Flavel, 34 Fed. 477 (D.C. Ore. 1888); The Julia Fowler, 49
Fed. 277 (S.D. N.Y. 1892).
5. See The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 122-123, 56 S.Ct. 707, 80 L.Ed.
1075 (1936).
6. Idem.
7. 38 Stat. 1185, § 20 (1915), as amended by 41 Stat. 1007, § 33 (1920), 46
U.S.C.A. § 688 (1926).
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time law.8 Despite the fact that assumption of risk is a defense
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act,9 under the Jones Act
the courts have continued to apply the prior admiralty rule with
respect to this defense in those cases in which the injury to the
seaman resulted from the unseaworthiness of the vessel, 10 a de-
fective appliance,1 an unsafe place to work,1 2 obedience to orders
of a superior,"8 or the negligence of a fellow servant. 4 Where the
defense has been allowed, "the employee was thought to have the
status of a stevedore or shore worker and not that of a seaman."' 5
The principal case is novel in that, for the first time since the
Jones Act, the Court passed upon the question as to whether as-
sumption of risk bars recovery where there existed alternative
available means by which the seaman could easily have avoided
the use of the defective appliance.
While both assumption of risk and contributory negligence
are defenses at common law, in admiralty the comparative negli-
gence rule is maintained without modification. 6 Consequently,
8. See The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 123, 56 S.Ct. 707, 80 L.Ed.
1075 (1936).
9. "In applying the Federal Employers' Liability Act ... it has been set-
tled by numerous decisions of this court that assumption of risk is a defense
in a suit brought to recover for injuries resulting from defective appliances,
the use of which is not required by the Federal Safety Appliance Act ....
The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 119-120, 56 S.Ct. 707, 80 L.Ed. 1075 (1936).
10. ". . . the rule is well settled that a seaman does not assume the risk
arising from the unseaworthy condition of the vessel on which he serves even
if such condition be known to him when he embarks." The New Berne, 80 F.
(2d) 244, 247 (C.C.A. 4th, 1935), and cases cited therein.
11. The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 56 S.Ct. 707, 80 L.Ed. 1075 (1936);
Howarth v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 24 F. (2d)
374 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1928); Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v. Palo, 64 F. (2d) 198 (C.C.A. 6th,
1933); American Pacific Whaling Co. v. Kristensen, 93 F. (2d) 17 (C.C.A. 9th,
1937); Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. v. Martini, 96 F. (2d) 632 (C.C.A. 6th, 1938),
cert. denied 305 U.S. 605, 59 S.Ct. 65, 83 L.Ed. 13 (1938). Cf. McGeorge v.
Charles Nelson Co., 107 Cal. App. 148, 290 Pac. 75 (1930), affirmed 136 Cal.
App. 638, 29 P. (2d) 426 (1934), cert. denied 293 U.S. 554, 55 S.Ct. 97, 79 L.Ed.
656 (1934); Smith v. United States, 96 F. (2d) 976 (C.C.A. 5th, 1938).
12. Beadle v. Spencer, 298 U.S. 124, 56 S.Ct. 712, 80 L.Ed. 1082 (1936);
McCall v. Inter Harbor Navigation Co., 154 Ore. 252, 59 P. (2d) 697 (1936).
13. South Atlantic S. S. Co. of Delaware v. Munkacsy, 7 W. W. Harr. 580,
187 Atl. 600 (Del. 1936), cert. denied 299 U.S. 607, 57 S.Ct. 233, 81 L.Ed. 448
(1936); Masjulis v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.,
31 F. (2d) 284 (C.C.A. 2nd, 1929); United States v. Boykin, 49 F. (2d) 762
(C.C.A. 5th, 1931); Hanson v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 65 F. (2d) 457 (C.C.A.
2nd, 1933).
14. Reed v. Director General of Railroads, 258 U.S. 92, 42 S.Ct. 191, 66
L.Ed. 480 (1922); Anderson v. Matson Nay. Co., 125 Cal. App. 447, 13 P. (2d)
1041 (1932); Paulsen v. McDuffie, 47 P. (2d) 709 (Cal. 1935).
15. Socony-Vacuum Co. v. Smith, 305 U. S. 424, 429, 59 S.Ct. 262, 83 L.Ed.
261 (1939), and cases cited therein.
16. Olson v. Flavel, 34 Fed. 477 (D.C. Ore. 1888); The Julia Fowler, 49
Fed. 277 (S.D. N.Y. 1892).
NOTES
for negligence to bar recovery in one case and merely to reduce
damages in the other would be inconsistent. It is necessary to
have a harmonious application of the admiralty doctrines of as-
sumption of risk and comparative negligence.
As a practical solution, the Court suggested that "any rule
of assumption of risk in admiralty, whatever its scope, must be
applied in conjunction with the established admiralty doctrine of
comparative negligence and in harmony with it. 1" Assumption
of risk may well serve to mitigate damages but must not be used
to completely bar recovery. Consequently, the Court applied the
rule of comparative negligence and the decision seems to be
correct.
J.D.M.
BANKS AND BANKING-DUTIES OF A DEPOSITOR TO His BANK-
STATUTES LIMITING TIME WITHIN WHICH SUITS MAY BE INSTI-
TUTED TO ENFORCE DRAWEE'S LIABILITY ON FORGED OR ATERED
CHECKS-An employee of the plaintiff, who had full charge of
his employer's check book, forged the latter's signature as drawer
and forged the indorsements of certain of plaintiff's employees
as payees to a number of checks in a skillfully executed series of
forgeries extending over a period of three years. Although the
plaintiff had not given notice of the forgeries in accordance with
the terms of Act 163 of 1934,1 he brought suit against the drawee
bank to recover the amount of the forged checks, which had
been paid by the drawee and charged to his account. The trial
court held Act 163 of 1934 to be unconstitutional on the ground
that the object of its provisions was not sufficiently indicated
by its title, but maintained the plea of prescription as to all
checks returned more than one year prior to the institution of
the suit. On appeal it was held that (1) the statute is constitu-
tional, (2) it is applicable to those checks on which both the
payee's indorsement and the drawer's signature were forged, and
(3) the plaintiff's suit was barred by failure to comply with the
17. Socony-Vacuum Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 431, 59 S.Ct. 262, 83 L.Ed.
261 (1939).
1. La. Act 163 of 1934, § 1 (Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1938) § 675.1] limits the
time within which the depositor must notify the bank of forged or raised
checks and checks payable to fictitious persons, to one year after the
return of the paid vouchers or notice that they are ready for delivery, if
the bank is to be held liable to the depositor for payment thereof.
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